O que Brown e Obergefell nos Ensinam sobre Contramajoritarismo? / What do Brown and Obergefell Teach us about Countermajoritarism?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17808/des.50.512Keywords:
Suprema Corte dos EUA, Casamento Gay, Contramajoritarismo, Federalismo / U.S. Supreme Court, Gay Marriage, Countermajoritarism, FederalismAbstract
O presente artigo propõe uma comparação entre Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) e Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015). A primeira decisão, por ser sensivelmente abstrata e influente no direito constitucional norte-americano, passou por um processo marcante de mitificação acerca de seu caráter contramajoritário. A segunda também protegeu uma minoria social com base na interpretação da cláusula de proteção igualitária e, assim, pode ser alvo desse mesmo fenômeno. Diante desse processo de mitificação, sustenta-se a hipótese de que há natureza majoritarista nas decisões de Brown e Obergefell. Embora ambas as decisões tenham protegido direitos de minorias sociais, tais mudanças interpretativas foram adiadas pela Suprema Corte norte-americana até que uma maioria qualificada de Estados já as tivesse implementado. A metodologia se baseou em dois parâmetros: o comportamento decisório da Corte e o status quo constitucional da matéria, representado pelo número de Estados favoráveis ou contrários a determinada interpretação constitucional.
Abstract
This article proposes a comparison between Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015). The first decision is significantly abstract and influential in American constitutional law. In this sense, it has passed through a remarkable process of mystification about its countermajoritarian character. The second one also has protected a social minority based on the interpretation of the equal protection clause. Thus, it is supposed to be aimed by the same phenomenon. Before this mystification process, this article supports the follow hypothesis: Brown and Obergefell decisions indicate a majoritarian profile. Both decisions have protected rights of social minorities, but the U.S. Supreme Court has delayed such interpretative changes until a qualified majority of the American States has already provided it. The methodology consists of two analytical parameters: the decision-making of the Court and the constitutional status quo of the matter defined by the number of States favorable or contrary to certain constitutional interpretation.
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